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Abstract 
During the course of the first thirty CRRI conferences, we have gained considerable insight 
about how to design regulatory policy in the presence of developing competition. The insight to 
date has focused on how to harness competitive forces to motivate incumbent suppliers to serve 
the best interests of consumers. This paper stresses the importance of considering the incentives 
of regulators and explores the associated changes in standard recommendations for regulatory 
policy design in the presence of developing competition. 
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1.  Introduction.  
At the time of the inaugural Center for Research in Regulated Industries (CRRI) 
conference, the economics literature focused on the design of regulatory policy in monopoly 
settings. This focus reflected industry practice, as many key regulated sectors (including the 
energy, telecommunications, and water sectors) exhibited substantial elements of monopoly 
supply. Few residential customers had a choice among energy or water suppliers, and AT&T was 
the dominant supplier of most telecommunications services. 
 Regulated industries have changed markedly in the last thirty years and the literature 
has changed accordingly. As competition developed in most regulated sectors, the literature 
explored how regulatory policy should change in the face of increasing competitive pressures. 
Price cap regulation, which affords incumbent suppliers expanded ability to compete with new 
industry suppliers, became a popular policy in practice and the subject of many scholarly studies 
(e.g. Crew and Kleindorfer 1996, 2002; Sappington, 2002; Vogelsang, 2002; Sappington and Weisman, 
2010). The popularity of price cap regulation stems in part from its ability to adapt readily to 
changing industry conditions as competitive forces develop (e.g., Sappington and Weisman, 
2010). 
 A substantial portion of the literature on regulation and competition analyzes how 
regulators can harness developing competitive forces to motivate incumbent suppliers to serve 
the best interests of consumers. In focusing on how to motivate incumbent suppliers, these 
studies often do not consider in detail the motivations of regulators. In practice, regulators do not 
always face ideal incentives to foster and manage industry competition appropriately. This is the 
case in part because competition can constrain a regulator’s ability to implement policies that 
favor some constituents over others (Posner, 1971). For example, unfettered entry of new 
suppliers can limit a regulator’s ability to set high prices for some services (e.g., long distance 
telephone service) in order to generate the revenue an incumbent supplier requires to finance 
particularly low prices for other services (e.g., basic local telephone service). 
 The incentives, mandates, and political pressures that regulators face imply that they 
may not be naturally inclined to follow standard prescriptions for the design of regulatory policy 
in the presence of developing competition. Therefore, some regulation of regulators may be 
appropriate. Although this observation and its implications have not been emphasized in the 
recent literature, the potential need to regulate regulators is well known. Indeed, in The 
Federalist No. 51, James Madison observes:  
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But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men 
were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither 
external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a 
government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: 
you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige 
it to control itself (Hamilton, Jay and Madison, 1961, p. 322). 
 
 Because regulators may not be naturally inclined to follow standard prescriptions for 
modifying regulatory policy in the presence of developing competition, additional policies that 
complement judicial review in encouraging compliance with these prescriptions warrant 
consideration, as do refinements of the standard prescriptions. This paper reviews common 
recommendations for adapting regulatory policy as competitive forces strengthen. The paper also 
explains when and why regulators may be reluctant to follow these recommendations, and 
provides additional recommendations to counteract this reluctance. For instance, we recommend 
more widespread use of stringent sunset rules with accompanying oversight by antitrust 
authorities to counteract common regulatory reluctance to relax industry controls. We also 
recommend that policymakers err on the side of eliminating regulatory control too early rather 
than too late.1 
 The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the reasons why regulators may 
not always have ideal incentives to manage industry competition appropriately. Section 3 
provides ten specific recommendations for how to structure industry policy in the presence of 
developing competition. Section 3 also identifies the elements of standard recommendations that 
regulators may be reluctant to follow, and suggests how to address this reluctance. Section 4 
concludes with a discussion of some of the many difficult questions that remain to be answered 
when designing regulatory policy in the presence of developing competition. 
2.  The Rationale for Regulating Regulators’ Incentives. 
 Regulators often implement policies that favor some constituents over others. To 
illustrate, regulators in the telecommunications industry set high prices for long distance 
telephone service in order to generate the revenues required to finance low prices for local 
service. Regulators also set identical prices for a service (e.g., local telephone service or first 
class mail service) throughout broad geographic regions despite large variation in the cost of 
                                                 
1  In this sense, the term “regulating regulators” may be somewhat of a misnomer. The regulation of regulators that 
we propose is better viewed as limiting or terminating key elements of regulatory control than as adding 
additional regulation in settings where regulation may already be excessive. 
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providing the service. In the railroad industry, regulators implemented “value of service pricing” 
that required rail carriers to charge relatively low prices for transporting commodities with low 
retail value and relatively high prices for transporting goods with high retail value.2 
 In some instances, regulators are following the mandates of legislators when they 
implement policies (e.g., geographic averaging of prices) that benefit one set of constituents 
(e.g., local telephone customers who reside in remote areas that are relatively costly to serve) at 
the expense of other constituents (e.g., local telephone customers who live in densely populated 
regions that are less costly to serve).3 In other instances, regulators are responding to the 
demands of well organized, politically powerful constituents when they implement policies that 
favor these constituents (Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976; Posner, 1975; McChesney, 1997). 
Whatever the impetus of policies that serve to redistribute surplus from less favored groups to 
more favored groups, regulators often continue to pursue the redistribution even when doing so 
limits the development of efficient competition.4 
 Competition can limit a regulator’s ability to redistribute surplus from one group of 
constituents to another. For example, as non-incumbent suppliers of long distance telephone 
service secure expanded capacity and visibility, high prices for an incumbent supplier’s long 
distance service may fail to generate substantial revenue that can be used to finance low prices 
for local telephone service. The high prices (and the associated cream-skimming behavior on the 
part of competitors that it encourages) may simply induce customers to seek alternative 
suppliers, and thereby reduce the incumbent supplier’s revenues. Similarly, new suppliers of 
mail service may operate primarily on the routes that are least costly to serve and thereby limit 
the profit the incumbent supplier otherwise would earn on these routes. Furthermore, competing 
transporters of commodities with high retail value (e.g., truckers) can siphon off the revenue that 
value of service pricing would otherwise generate for incumbent rail carriers. 
 To protect revenue sources that finance valued redistribution, regulators can be tempted 
to limit the operations of competitors (Posner, 1971). Indeed, state regulators – those with direct 
                                                 
2  This mandate was intended in part to secure low transport prices for producers of agricultural 
products. 
3  Section 254(3)(b) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 states: “Consumers in all regions of the 
Nation, including low-income consumers and those in rural, insular, and high-cost areas, should have 
access to telecommunications and information services … that are reasonably comparable to those 
services provided in urban regions and that are available at rates that are reasonably comparable to 
rates charged for similar services in urban areas.”  
4  Efficient competition denotes competition that increases long term industry welfare. Inefficient 
competition is competition that reduces long term industry welfare. 
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political accountability for rising local service rates – often opposed long distance competition 
on the grounds that such competition would erode subsidies to local service.5 Regulators also 
imposed cost-increasing restrictions on trucks to limit their ability to attract lucrative traffic from 
railroads.6 In addition, regulators implemented strict pricing, entry, and exit controls in the 
commercial airline industry that served to limit competition despite substantial evidence that the 
industry could support additional competitors (Levine, 1965, 1987). Corresponding controls have 
been imposed in the postal industry (Crew and Kleindorfer, 2011).  
  Regulators may also be tempted to limit industry competition because competition can 
introduce chaotic, unpredictable forces into the industry. In contrast, regulators are naturally 
inclined to favor stable, predictable industry performance, in part because they are held 
accountable for all problems that arise in the industry. Kahn (1984, p. 8) suggests there may be 
“… no rational half-way house between thorough regulation and free competition” in part 
because “the regulatory mentality is hostile to competition.” In addition, regulation entails 
control, and a regulator that considers substituting competitive discipline for direct regulatory 
control is contemplating the unnatural and often disconcerting act of relinquishing control 
(Weisman and Robinson, 2009). Furthermore, diminished regulatory control can engender 
efforts to reduce regulatory resources, and regulators typically are averse to resource reductions 
(including the loss of jobs for valued staff members). 
 Even as regulators encounter incentives to discourage efficient competition in some 
settings, they may face incentives to encourage inefficient competition in other settings. For 
example, regulators may be inclined to demonstrate that they are fostering industry competition 
because competition is widely viewed as a source of lower prices and innovative services for 
consumers. Such demonstrations may involve documenting an increased number of industry 
competitors. However, long run industry welfare does not necessarily increase as the number of 
industry competitors increases. To illustrate, suppose a regulator requires an incumbent supplier 
                                                 
5  Brock (1994, Chapter 11) notes that state regulators and Congress both sought to block federal 
regulators from setting cost-based rates for interstate telephone service. Crandall and Waverman 
(1995, p. 85) estimate the annual welfare loss from inefficient pricing of telecommunications services 
in the U.S. to be $8 billion annually. Some experts also suggest that the cost of regulatory delay 
associated with the introduction of cellular telephone service in the U.S. exceeded $25 billion annually 
(Hausman, 1997). 
6  Indeed, rather than emulate competitive discipline in the rail and truck industries, the Interstate 
Commerce Commission sought to cartelize the industries in order to avoid destructive price wars 
(Keeler, 1983; Baumol and Walton, 1973). The cartelization took the form of strict control over 
industry pricing and operating procedures.  
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to make its network available for use by competing suppliers at non-compensatory prices. Such a 
policy can increase the number of competitors in the short run. However, it can also discourage 
the incumbent supplier from maintaining, expanding, and enhancing its network. The policy also 
can limit the incentives of competitors to build their own networks. Both effects can reduce long 
term industry welfare.7 
 Regulators may also be tempted to foster inefficient competition in some settings in order 
to transfer to favored constituents surplus that would otherwise accrue to the incumbent supplier. 
To illustrate, consider a setting where the incumbent supplier operates under a price cap 
regulation plan that severs the link between the supplier’s earnings and the rate at which it can 
increase the prices of its retail services. Under such a plan, the regulator is not obligated to alter 
the prevailing pricing rules even if the incumbent supplier’s earnings fall far below expected 
levels. Consequently, a regulator might be tempted to facilitate competitive entry that reduces 
prices for certain services, knowing that she will not have to authorize higher prices for other 
services in order to ensure reasonable earnings for the incumbent supplier.8 
 For all these reasons, regulators may not always be inclined to promote efficient 
competition and limit inefficient competition appropriately. Consequently, policies that alter 
imperfect regulatory incentives or counter the undesirable effects of these incentives merit 
consideration. We suggest some such policies in section 3 in the course of reviewing standard 
recommendations for the design of regulatory policy in the presence of developing competition. 
3.  Recommendations for Regulating Regulators.  
 We now present ten specific recommendations for adapting regulatory policy in the 
presence of developing competition. Many of these recommendations (e.g., Recommendations 1, 
3, 4, and 10) reflect well-known principles. Others (e.g., Recommendations 2, 6, 7, 8, and 9) 
include some new suggestions. In reviewing these recommendations, we identify elements that 
regulators may be reluctant to follow. We also offer recommendations that may help to 
counteract regulatory reluctance to foster efficient competition and discourage inefficient 
competition. 
                                                 
7  Some studies present evidence of such discouragement in the telecommunications industry in recent 
years (e.g., Grajek and Röller, 2011). Ginsburg (2009, p. 5) discusses some of the problems that arise 
from “synthetic competition,” which occurs “in a market subject to a regulatory regime designed to 
assure there are multiple sellers regardless of whether fewer firms … would be more efficient.” 
8  See Lehman and Weisman (2000a,b) for further discussion of such behavior and evidence that the 
behavior may have occurred in the telecommunications industry in recent years. 
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Recommendation 1.   Set prices to reflect efficient, realized production costs. 
 As competition develops in an industry, the prices a regulated incumbent supplier charges 
should reflect its production costs. Otherwise, industry costs can rise as efficient competitors are 
excluded from the industry and inefficient competitors are allowed to prosper in the industry.9 
 When an incumbent supplier’s price for a service is less than its unit cost of production, a 
more efficient competitor may be unable to operate profitably in the industry. Conversely, if an 
incumbent supplier is required to maintain a price that exceeds its unit cost of production, a less 
efficient competitor can set a lower price and thereby attract consumers. In both cases, prices that 
diverge from cost can increase industry operating costs and undermine the natural competitive 
forces that promote the operation of the least-cost industry suppliers.10 
 For the reasons identified in section 2, regulators may not always be inclined to 
implement prices that reflect the costs of the incumbent supplier.11 However, regulators can be 
encouraged to do so. For instance, the benefits that regulators often feel compelled to deliver to 
favored constituents through the regulated price structure might be delivered in alternative ways. 
For example, subsidies might be provided to low-income individuals who purchase regulated 
service in regions where the service is particularly costly to deliver. These subsidies could be 
financed either by general tax revenues or by a competitively neutral tax on all industry 
suppliers. Such a tax helps to minimize industry costs by ensuring that inefficient suppliers do 
not prevail in the market simply because they are not obligated to pay a tax that the incumbent 
supplier must pay.12 
Recommendation 2.   Employ competitive discipline to complement, substitute for, and/or 
inform regulatory discipline. 
                                                 
9  Armstrong and Sappington (2006) offer a corresponding recommendation. The authors also endorse 
the central elements of recommendations 3, 4, and 10 below. 
10  As Baumol and Sidak (1994, p. 37) observe, the prices generated by market forces, in contrast to 
regulated prices, often approximate Ramsey prices.   
11  Crandall (1989, p. 122) notes that regulators may not be alone in their desire to set prices that diverge 
from production costs. He suggests that AT&T may have tolerated ongoing subsidies from long 
distance telephone service to basic local service in order to garner strong allies – state regulators – in 
opposing competitive entry into long-distance markets.   
12  See Armstrong (2001, 2002), for example, for further discussion of this issue. 
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 The stringency and structure of regulatory policy should be adapted to reflect the strength 
and nature of the prevailing competitive discipline. To illustrate this more general principle, 
consider the appropriate design of price cap regulation.  
Price cap regulation specifies the rate at which the incumbent supplier’s inflation-
adjusted prices can increase, on average. The essence of price cap regulation is to choose an 
appropriate rate of authorized price increase. A rate that is too high can harm consumers by 
permitting supra-competitive prices. A rate that is too low can jeopardize the financial integrity 
of the regulated supplier and thereby reduce the intensity of industry competition and limit the 
ability of the incumbent supplier to serve its customers’ needs. 
 Unavoidably imperfect information makes it virtually impossible for regulators to 
identify precisely the ideal rate of authorized price increase. Developing competition, though, 
reduces the likely harm from setting relatively lenient price controls. An incumbent supplier that 
increases prices substantially above cost in response to relaxed regulatory mandates emboldens 
potential and actual competitors by affording them expanded opportunity for profitable 
operation. Consequently, the incumbent supplier may choose not to take full advantage of 
authorized price increases, which limits the short term harm from lenient price controls. 
Furthermore, the long term harm from lenient price controls is diminished by the increased 
competition that short term price increases engender. 
 Furthermore, overly stringent price controls can stifle competition by limiting the 
opportunity for profitable industry operation. Therefore, as competition intensifies in an industry, 
less stringent explicit price controls generally are advisable.13 Regulators in the United Kingdom 
appeared to acknowledge these considerations in 2003 when, rather than continuing to mandate 
reductions in the average price charged by British Telecom, they simply required no increase in 
the average price. The regulators noted that “such a safeguard control reduces the risk of 
distortion of competition” (OFTEL, 2003, ¶ 6.17).14 
                                                 
13  Robinson and Weisman (2008, pp. 534-540) observe that because regulators typically have relatively 
short tenures and because prices are more readily measured than is innovation, some regulators may be 
inclined to emphasize short term price reductions over long term innovation. 
14  Because consumers and elected officials often are concerned primarily with short term benefits and 
costs, regulators may face severe criticism if they implement policies that impose short term costs 
(e.g., current high prices) in order to secure long term benefits (e.g., future low prices and product 
innovation). To limit such criticism, regulators can publicly embrace the many long term benefits that 
arise when current regulatory policies stimulate efficient long term competition. As The 1996 
Telecommunications Act (Preamble and Section 706) and Colorado Revised Statutes (2008, Section 
40-15-501) emphasize, these benefits can include reduced regulation, lower prices, increased product 
quality and variety, and enhanced investment in modern industry infrastructure. Regulators also may 
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  Competitive forces often develop at different rates in different market segments. When 
they do, regulations can and should be modified to limit regulatory protection to where it is 
needed. For example, price controls might be imposed only in geographic regions where 
competitive discipline is limited. In addition, regulations might be focused on the wholesale 
sector of an industry where competition is limited, and largely removed from the retail sector if 
actual or potential competition prevails there. Furthermore, regulatory protection might be 
focused on consumers with limited income in settings where competitors offer high quality 
substitutes for a regulated service at prices that exceed the price of the regulated service. More 
targeted regulation can best serve consumers by reducing the costs of regulation and by limiting 
distortions of the competitive process. 
 Uneven development of competitive forces also can allow regulators to employ market 
outcomes in regions with stronger competitive pressure to inform the design of regulatory policy 
in regions with less pronounced competitive pressure. To illustrate, suppose production costs are 
known to be similar throughout a geographic area that is comprised of regions A and B. Further 
suppose that competition is substantially more developed in region A than in region B. A 
regulatory policy that requires identical prices in regions A and B without explicitly mandating 
particular price levels can import into region B the disciplinary benefits of competition in region 
A.15 
 Corresponding benefits can be secured in settings where a regulator is well informed 
about the prevailing differences in production costs across regions A and B, but knows relatively 
little about the prevailing cost levels. To illustrate, if unit production costs are known to be 20% 
higher in region B than in region A, the regulator can restrict prices in region B to be no more 
than 120% of the prices in region A.  
 In practice, the information required to import the full intensity of competition from one 
region to another typically will not be available.16,17 However, regulators often can glean from 
                                                                                                                                                             
be well served by documenting the benefits that efforts to stimulate efficient long term competition 
(and innovation) have produced in other jurisdictions. 
15  When it eliminated most retail price controls in the U.K. in 2006, OFCOM (2006, section 5.9) 
required British Telecom to “price its narrowband services on a uniform basis, irrespective of 
geographic location.”  
16  Prevailing prices typically reflect both demand and cost considerations. In principle, cross-region price 
differentials could be specified that reflect relevant differences in both costs and demand (Hausman 
and Sidak, 2007). In practice, though, the relevant calculations can be complex and can require 
considerable information that often is not readily available to regulators. 
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observing outcomes in more competitive regions useful information about the outcomes that 
might reasonably be achieved in less competitive regions. 
Recommendation 3.   Limit under-funded asymmetric obligations on incumbent suppliers. 
 Regulators typically decline to impose on non-incumbent suppliers the same restrictions 
they impose on incumbent suppliers. A desire to avoid expanding the boundaries of regulatory 
control is commendable. However, regulators should seek to ensure that any asymmetric 
application of rules and regulations serves the long term interests of consumers. 
 To illustrate, consider the asymmetric imposition of a carrier-of-last-resort (COLR) 
obligation on an incumbent supplier.18 It is costly for a supplier to stand ready to provide service 
to any customer that might ultimately choose to purchase the service. Therefore, in the absence 
of any direct compensation for assuming the COLR obligation, the incumbent supplier will need 
to set its prices to recover these costs. A competing supplier that faces no COLR obligation does 
not incur the associated costs, and so can profitably charge lower prices than the incumbent 
supplier.  In such a case, the competitor may be able to prevail in the marketplace not because it 
is the more efficient or the more innovative supplier, but simply because a COLR obligation has 
been imposed asymmetrically on the incumbent supplier (Kahn, 1971, p. 238).19 
 This simple example illustrates the more general principle that as competition develops in 
an industry, it is important to continually review the obligations that have been imposed on 
incumbent suppliers. Obligations that do not clearly deliver benefits to consumers in excess of 
the corresponding costs should be eliminated or revised appropriately. A corollary of this 
principle is that the preferred means to avoid undesirable asymmetric obligations on different 
industry suppliers often is to reduce the obligation on the incumbent supplier rather than extend 
the obligation to non-incumbent suppliers. 
                                                                                                                                                             
17  Furthermore, a mandate to set the same or a similar price in different regions can reduce the intensity 
of competition in the more competitive region. A supplier will be reluctant to reduce the price it 
charges in the more competitive regions when it knows that this price reduction will obligate it to 
reduce the price it charges in the less competitive region. See DeGraba (1987). 
18  A supplier with a carrier-of-last-resort obligation must provide a designated service at a specified price 
to any customer that requests the service, regardless of the magnitude of the financial loss the supplier 
might incur in providing the service (Weisman, 1988).   
19  A delicate balancing of consumers’ needs to be served and suppliers’ obligations to serve is required 
to ensure the ongoing attraction of essential industry investment. Competition and an asymmetric 
COLR obligation can upset this balance and thereby jeopardize industry investment (Posner, 1971; 
Goldberg, 1976; de Butts, 1973). 
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 In settings where a COLR obligation is deemed to be essential, all suppliers might be 
invited to bid for the right to serve as the COLR supplier. The winning bidder would be the 
supplier that agrees to assume the obligation in return for the least compensation. The 
compensation delivered to the winning bidder might be financed by a symmetric tax placed on 
all industry suppliers. 
 Limiting under-funded asymmetric obligations on industry suppliers can be viewed as 
one form of “leveling the playing field” for industry suppliers. It is important to note in this 
regard that the playing field should be leveled ex ante to ensure an equal opportunity for all 
industry suppliers to compete on the merits. The playing field should not be leveled ex post to 
ensure that industry participants secure comparable returns.20 Nor should the field be adjusted to 
provide efficient and inefficient suppliers with the same prospects of succeeding in the 
marketplace.21 Attempts to handicap winners and subsidize losers in the competitive process can 
dull incentives for superior performance, to the long term detriment of consumers. 
 
Recommendation 4.  Empower consumers to discipline industry suppliers. 
 
 When they operate in settings with developing competition, regulators can enlist the aid 
of consumers in imposing discipline on incumbent suppliers. Regulators can do so by making 
relevant information readily available to consumers and by limiting impediments to use of this 
information. 
 Consumers discipline suppliers by awarding their patronage to the supplier that best 
serves their needs. For this form of discipline to be effective, consumers must be well aware of 
the set of suppliers that could conceivably serve their needs, the services these suppliers offer, 
and the terms and conditions on which the services are supplied. Regulators can help to 
disseminate this information in settings where consumers do not readily access the information 
on their own, perhaps simply because they are unaccustomed to having a choice among suppliers 
                                                 
20  Kahn (1984, p. 9) observes that “The regulator tends as a matter of constitutional preference … to 
convert the maintaining of the ‘level playing fields’ into an interference with the contest itself. 
Regulators move from trying to assure a fair and equal start to ensuring an equal finish; to preserve 
whatever the regulator conceives to be the proper market shares of the various competitors.”  
21  The Antitrust Modernization Commission (2007, p. 34) observes that “… the Supreme Court in 1977 
stated without caveat that “the antitrust laws … were enacted for the ‘protection of competition, not 
competitors.’ … [T]rade-offs exist between the goals of consumer welfare and protecting small firms. 
To protect small firms can mean a less efficient economy in which consumers must pay higher prices 
(footnotes omitted).” 
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of the regulated service. Regulators might assemble the relevant information on their websites, 
for example, and require incumbent suppliers to report the address for the website on the bills 
they send to customers. 
 Performance information also can help consumers choose among potential suppliers. In 
settings where regulators collect price and quality information, they can make this information 
available to consumers. Of course, many consumers find it difficult to devote the time required 
to review relevant performance data carefully, and some consumers can find such reviews to be 
challenging. Consequently, it is important to present relevant data in a readily accessible 
format.22 When possible, regulators also should avoid emphasizing unduly a few limited 
dimensions of performance. Such emphasis can induce suppliers to focus their efforts on 
improving the most emphasized performance dimensions while devoting relatively little effort to 
less emphasized dimensions. In settings where regulators do not collect performance data, they 
can direct consumers to independent organizations that collect the data. Regulators might also 
support customer blogs that allow consumers to describe their experiences with industry 
suppliers. 
 Regulators also can help empower consumers to discipline incumbent (and non-
incumbent) suppliers by limiting customer impediments to switching suppliers. To illustrate, 
number portability requirements that enable a consumer to maintain her same telephone number 
if she switches to a new supplier of telephone service decreases the inconvenience associated 
with switching suppliers. As the cost of switching suppliers declines, consumers become more 
likely to switch to a new supplier when they become dissatisfied with the performance of their 
present supplier. The threat of losing customers can impose substantial discipline on all industry 
suppliers, given the relatively high costs of attracting new (and former) customers.23   
Recommendation 5.   Foster enduring, effective competition. 
                                                 
22  The U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC, 2009, ¶ 5) emphasizes “the importance of 
identifying [information] disclosure policies that have a high ratio of consumer benefit to industry 
cost. If designed correctly, disclosure policies are among the least intrusive regulatory measures at the 
Commission’s disposal. Moreover, access to accurate information plays a central role in maintaining a 
well-functioning marketplace that encourages competition, innovation, low prices, and high-quality 
services” (footnotes omitted).    
23  To ensure that consumers base their choice of supplier on the relative performance of suppliers in the 
marketplace, regulators should not provide artificial inducements for customers to leave the incumbent 
provider for a rival (Kahn, 1999). 
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 Regulators may have some choice regarding the type of competition they foster. In the 
telecommunications industry, for example, regulators can encourage the operation of retail 
suppliers that do little more than re-sell the services of facilities-based incumbent suppliers.24 
Alternatively, regulators can encourage the operation of new facilities-based suppliers of 
telecommunications services. Non-facilities-based competition is encouraged when incumbent 
suppliers are required to make their networks available for use by retail competitors on terms that 
are particularly favorable to the competitors. Terms that are less attractive to competitors (i.e., 
higher access charges) and more limited mandates to make network elements available to 
competitors can encourage non-incumbent suppliers to invest in their own facilities. Competition 
among independent facilities-based suppliers can generate innovative services and provide strong 
incentives to deliver these services at low cost.25 Consequently, even though relatively high 
access charges may limit competitive pressures from non-facilities-based suppliers in the short 
run, the high charges can enhance the prospects for intense facilities-based competition in the 
long run (Grajek and Röller, 2011; Hazlett, 2006; Hazlett and Caliskan, 2008).26 Such competition can 
reduce the need for enduring industry regulation.27  
 In settings where a loyal customer base substantially reduces the financial risk associated 
with investing in network facilities, access charges that increase over time may facilitate a 
transition to robust facilities-based competition. New industry suppliers can initially employ the 
incumbent’s network at relatively low cost to attract a customer base. The new suppliers can 
subsequently construct and employ their own networks to serve customers rather than pay 
increasing access charges to incumbent suppliers (Avenali et al., 2010).28 
                                                 
24  Gifford (2003) suggests that regulators may encourage such competition in part to bolster the case that 
they have successfully fostered robust industry competition. 
25  The U.S. Federal Communications and the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications 
Commission have both expressed a preference for facilities-based competition rather than competition 
that relies upon resale or unbundled network elements. See FCC (2005, ¶¶ 2, 33, 218, and note 594) 
and CRTC (1997, ¶ 73). 
26  Cambini and Jiang (2009) review recent studies of the impact of regulatory policy on broadband 
infrastructure investment.  
27  Consequently, fostering such competition is consistent with the call to “reduce regulation” (Preamble, 
1996 Telecommunications Act of 1996. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.)). 
28  Regulators may face criticism if some non-facilities-based suppliers fail as access charges rise 
(Robinson and Weisman, 2008). However, such failure could reflect the shortcomings of suppliers 
rather than flawed regulatory policy. The non-facilities-based suppliers that fail may predominantly be 
firms that are unable to convince capital markets to fund their business plans. 
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Recommendation 6.   Implement standards that foster, but do not abuse, competitive discipline. 
 The vibrant and often unpredictable nature of competition can produce substantial 
volatility in the earnings of industry participants. Regulated incumbent suppliers should not be 
insulated from the increased earnings risk that competition can introduce. Such insulation would 
dull the incumbent supplier’s incentive to compete vigorously against industry rivals, and 
thereby harm consumers. On the other hand, market competition should not be artificially 
propagated so as to expropriate the incumbent supplier. 
 To illustrate this more general conclusion, consider a setting where the incumbent 
supplier operates under price cap regulation that divorces the rate at which its prices can increase 
from its realized costs and earnings. Such a plan can provide strong incentives for the incumbent 
supplier to operate efficiently. However, as noted in section 2, it can also create incentives for 
regulators  to disadvantage the incumbent supplier, in part by implementing rules that unduly 
favor non-incumbent suppliers. For example, the regulator might obligate the incumbent supplier 
to provide retail competitors with access to its network on terms and conditions that are very 
favorable to the competitors. Alternatively, the regulator might saddle the incumbent supplier 
asymmetrically with costly carrier-of-last-resort obligations or mandates to deliver levels of 
service quality in excess of surplus-maximizing levels. Such policies can effectively enable 
regulators to deliver benefits to consumers without obligating consumers to bear the associated 
costs. 
 An incumbent supplier’s ability to attract the capital required for ongoing operation can 
be seriously impeded by regulatory policies that provide substantial advantages to competitors at 
the expense of incumbent suppliers. Therefore, it is appropriate to limit the incidence of such 
policies without unduly impeding the regulator’s ability to implement desirable industry policy. 
One way to do so may be to adopt a standard for appropriate regulatory policy that explicitly 
recognizes and discourages actions that advantage competitors in such a way as to expropriate 
incumbent suppliers.29 For example, the Hope standard might be explicitly augmented to limit 
                                                 
29  In principle, incentives for regulatory expropriation can be limited by replacing price cap regulation 
with earnings sharing regulation (ESR). ESR generally insures an incumbent supplier against 
particularly low earnings, and so regulatory policies that produce low earnings for the incumbent 
supplier become costly for the regulator. In practice, though, regulators typically have some discretion 
in how earnings are measured. Consequently, ESR may fail to provide the incumbent supplier with 
substantial protection against expropriation, even as it dulls the incumbent’s incentives for superior 
performance in the marketplace. An obligation to share revenues, rather than earnings, may provide 
some protection against such expropriation (Sappington and Weisman, 1996b). 
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regulatory takings,30 as in the Market Street Railway decision. The Hope standard, which is 
generally recognized as the litmus test for whether a firm that operates under rate of return 
regulation has been afforded adequate revenue, indicates that the regulated firm is entitled to a 
“return … sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to 
maintain its credit and attract capital.”31 The Market Street Railway decision indicates that while 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be applied to “insure values or 
restore values that have been lost by the operation of economic forces,” the clause does protect 
utilities against “governmental destruction of existing economic values.”32 
 In practice, it is difficult to distinguish precisely between the natural operation of 
competitive forces and unnatural propagation of these forces that expropriate incumbent 
suppliers. Therefore, undesirable regulatory expropriation may be difficult to identify and 
preclude. However, explicit recognition of the fact that excessive advantaging of competitors can 
serve to expropriate incumbent suppliers and explicit directives to avoid such expropriation may 
help to limit its incidence.33 
Recommendation 7.   Continuously assess where ongoing regulation is essential, eliminate 
regulation where it is not essential, and employ stringent sunset 
provisions with antitrust oversight where appropriate. 
 It is imperative that regulators constantly gather the data required to make an informed 
assessment of the extent to which regulatory controls can be altered or relaxed. Data on the 
capacities and the potential service areas of all industry competitors can be of particular value in 
                                                 
30  A “taking” can be viewed as a confiscation of property without adequate compensation. See Sidak and 
Spulber (1997) and Weisman (2002). 
31  See Federal Power Commission vs. Hope Natural Gas Co. (1944).    
32  Market Street Railway Co. v. Railroad Commission of California (1945). In Duquesne Light Co. vs. 
Barasch (1989), the Supreme Court ruled that a regulator need not permit an incumbent supplier to 
recover an investment that was prudent at the time it was made but is no longer used and useful due to 
unforeseen consequences. The Court observed that such investments would not be recoverable in a 
competitive market. An important question is whether Duquesne should apply if the prudent 
investment is no longer used and useful primarily because of regulatory policies that are excessively 
advantageous to competitors of the incumbent supplier. 
33  Under the Hope standard, a regulatory policy that advantages rivals and disadvantages the incumbent 
does not constitute a taking as long as the incumbent supplier’s earnings are adequate. (See Verizon 
Communications Inc. vs. FCC, 2002.) Such a standard admits a serious incentive problem because the 
more efficient and innovative is the incumbent supplier, the greater are its earnings and thus the 
greater is the regulator’s discretion to expropriate the incumbent and advantage its rivals.    
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this regard. Regulators may need to keep this data confidential in order to prevent undesired 
disclosure of proprietary information. However, regulators must have this data in order to 
determine the extent to which competitive discipline can substitute for direct regulatory control. 
 Coordination among regulators would be particularly useful in this regard to ensure that 
all regulators have ongoing access to consistent, comprehensive, and current data. A data set that 
records regulatory decisions and industry performance across a broad set of regulatory 
jurisdictions would help regulators determine when market forces are sufficient to protect 
consumers adequately and to assess the types of regulatory control that best protect consumers 
when such protection is warranted.   
 Even when the relevant data are available, it is difficult to assess precisely when and how 
regulatory policies should be modified to reflect developing competition. In the face of 
uncertainty about the most appropriate policy changes, the easiest change to implement often is 
no change at all. Sunset provisions can be employed to limit inertia that would otherwise keep 
rules and regulations in place beyond their useful life. Sunset provisions can specify that 
substantial regulatory change (e.g., forbearance or even complete deregulation) will be 
implemented at a specified date unless convincing evidence is presented to justify the ongoing 
need for the prevailing regulations. By clearly indicating the intended transitory nature of 
regulations, sunset provisions can help to avoid the natural, but often inappropriate, presumption 
that regulations are an inevitable and enduring feature of the industry landscape. Sunset 
provisions also shift the burden of proof from the advocates of change (who must otherwise 
prove that substantial regulatory change is appropriate) to regulators, who must now demonstrate 
why change is not appropriate.34,35 
 The demonstrations mandated by sunset provisions generally should be overseen by an 
entity other than the regulator. Otherwise, the regulator would effectively act as both the key 
litigant and the judge in the proceeding. The required oversight might be provided by the 
relevant federal antitrust authority, for example. Oversight by federal antitrust agencies can be 
particularly appropriate because of the typical experience, skills, and focus of these agencies. 
Antitrust authorities often have considerable expertise both in assessing whether industry 
suppliers have substantial market power and in identifying the sources of such power. 
                                                 
34  To help encourage efficient competition, the Canadian government dictated specific criteria that 
regulators must employ to determine when forbearance from regulation is warranted (Industry Canada, 
2007). Brennan (2008) provides a useful account and assessment of related developments. 
35  By requiring regulators to continually justify their policies, sunset provisions also can help to limit 
undesirable regulatory expropriation. 
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Determining the nature and the strength of prevailing market power is the key issue in assessing 
whether a substantial reduction in regulatory oversight is appropriate. Furthermore, in contrast to 
regulators, antitrust agencies typically oversee activities in a broad array of industries. 
Consequently, antitrust agencies tend to be less susceptible to capture by powerful constituents in 
a regulated industry. Their reduced risk of capture, along with their experience, skills, and focus 
tend to make federal antitrust agencies particularly capable overseers of sunset provisions.36  
 When they decide whether ongoing regulation or deregulation is more appropriate, 
antitrust authorities are more likely to base their decision on which option is likely to ensure a 
higher level of long term industry welfare.37 Anticipating such a decision on the part of antitrust 
authorities, regulators who favor ongoing regulatory control will be reluctant to undertake 
policies that reduce long term welfare by impeding efficient competition. Such policies will only 
encourage antitrust authorities to mandate industry deregulation. Therefore, the prospect of 
antitrust oversight can encourage regulation that promotes efficient competition. 
 Courts presently provide the primary oversight of regulatory decisions. This oversight is 
limited, though, because courts typically defer to regulators on key substantive issues. Courts 
tend to remand or vacate regulatory decisions only if regulators have clearly violated required 
procedures or prescribed mandates.  As the U.S. Supreme Court has observed, the primary “job 
of judges is to ask whether [a regulator] made choices reasonably within the pale of statutory 
possibility,”38 not whether the choices promote efficient industry competition.39 While courts can 
                                                 
36  Antitrust influence in regulatory proceedings has precedence. To illustrate, the U.S. Department of 
Justice commissioned a study of the merits of the line-of-business restrictions on the Bell Operating 
Companies (Huber, 1987). Furthermore, Section 271(d)(2)(a) of the 1996 Telecommunications Act 
requires the Justice Department to be consulted on the advisability of allowing the Bell Companies to 
enter the interLATA long-distance market. In Canada, the Competition Bureau has played a prominent 
role in essential facilities cases and regulatory forbearance matters in the telecommunications industry. 
See, for example, CRTC (2005, 2007a,b).     
37  To illustrate, in assessing potential regulatory policy in broadband markets, the U.S. Department of 
Justice advised the FCC to “monitor carefully those areas in which only a single provider offers – or 
even two providers offer – broadband service. Although enacting some form of regulation to prevent 
certain providers from exercising market power may be tempting with regard to such areas, care must 
be taken to avoid stifling the infrastructure investments needed to expand broadband access. In 
particular, price regulation would be appropriate only where necessary to protect consumers from the 
exercise of monopoly power and where such regulation would not stifle incentives to invest in 
infrastructure deployment” (USDOJ, 2010, p. 28). 
38  Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC, 2002, at 539. 
39  In his dissenting opinion in Verizon, Justice Breyer observes that “As a reviewing Court, we must 
determine … whether the Commission has ‘abuse[d]’ its statutorily delegated ‘discretion’ to create 
implementing rules. … In doing so, we must assume that Congress intended to grant the Commission 
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continue to employ their legal expertise to help ensure that regulators act in a manner that is 
broadly consistent with their mandates, antitrust agencies can employ their expertise in matters 
relating to market power and industry competition to assess whether regulatory rulings promote 
efficient industry competition and discourage inefficient competition. 
 Of course, antitrust authorities, like regulators, typically will be obligated to follow 
legislative mandates. Consequently, antitrust authorities will not have unmitigated discretion to 
terminate legislated benefits for certain groups of customers or ignore legislative mandates that 
inhibit efficient competition or promote inefficient competition. However, legislation typically 
provides considerable discretion in how broad mandates are achieved, and antitrust authorities 
often are well situated to help ensure that specified legislative mandates are fulfilled with the 
smallest possible loss of industry surplus.40 
 Antitrust authorities, like regulators, will not be immune to political pressure 
(McChesney and Shughart, 1995). However, federal antitrust authorities may be somewhat 
insulated from local political pressure. Furthermore, requiring antitrust authorities to oversee pre-
ordained sunset proceedings at specified time intervals can limit the discretion of antitrust 
officials regarding the cases they will pursue. This reduced discretion can help render antitrust 
authorities less vulnerable to political pressure. 
Recommendation 8.   Err on the side of eliminating regulatory controls too early rather than 
too late. 
 It can be difficult in practice to determine precisely when substantial regulatory change 
such as forbearance or deregulation is warranted. If a substantial reduction in regulatory control 
is implemented before competition has developed to the point where it can discipline incumbent 
suppliers adequately (i.e., if “early deregulation” occurs), consumers may face higher prices 
                                                                                                                                                             
broad legal leeway in respect to the substantive content of the rules” (Verizon Communications Inc. v. 
FCC, 2002, at 541-42). Similarly, the Supreme Court notes that “When a challenge to agency 
construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the 
agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the 
challenge must fail. In such a case, federal judges – who have no constituency – have a duty to respect 
legitimate policy choices by those who do” (Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 1984, at 866). 
40  For example, in settings where ongoing government intervention is deemed to be warranted to foster 
universal service, antitrust authorities might insist that all industry participants contribute to a 
universal service fund in a competitively neutral manner rather than impose (under-funded) 
obligations asymmetrically on incumbent suppliers. See Recommendation 3.  
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and/or reduced service quality. Different inefficiencies can emerge if regulatory control persists 
beyond the point at which competition alone can discipline all industry suppliers adequately (i.e., 
if “late deregulation” occurs). One such inefficiency is the reduced intensity of industry 
competition that typically arises when potential suppliers of new products and services decline to 
enter the industry because the incumbent’s artificially low prices render such entry unprofitable. 
Another inefficiency arises from the higher industry costs resulting from the fact that inefficient 
entrants may be able to operate profitably simply because they do not face the same restrictions 
that incumbent suppliers face. 
 The practical difficulties associated with determining precisely when deregulation (or, 
more generally, a substantial reduction in regulatory control) is appropriate place regulators in 
the unenviable position of choosing between deregulation that is likely to be either too early or 
too late. Faced with this choice, erring on the side of early deregulation often is advisable.41 This 
is the case in part because the problems associated with early deregulation are more amenable to 
self-correction than are the problems caused by late deregulation. 
 To explain this asymmetry, suppose early deregulation permits the incumbent supplier to 
set prices substantially above cost and the incumbent chooses to do so. The resulting increased 
opportunity to secure profit will stimulate increased entry by efficient suppliers.42 Similarly, if 
relaxed service quality regulation leads the incumbent supplier to reduce the quality it delivers to 
its customers below surplus-maximizing levels, the customers will intensify their search for 
alternative suppliers who offer a preferred combination of quality and price.  
 In contrast, the problems associated with late deregulation typically are not self-
correcting. To illustrate, regulated prices set below the incumbent supplier’s unit cost of 
production typically allow little or no opportunity for profitable operation by non-incumbent 
suppliers. In addition, outdated mandates to provide levels of service quality in excess of the 
levels that consumers wish to purchase can limit an incumbent supplier’s ability to attract and 
                                                 
41  When antitrust authorities have the power to determine when deregulation is appropriate, deregulation 
will tend to be implemented sooner if the prevailing regulatory policy discourages efficient entry. In 
such a case, antitrust authorities are relatively likely to conclude that even imperfect competition is 
superior to the prevailing imperfect regulation. 
42  The entry will be more pronounced if potential competitors believe the incumbent’s high prices will 
persist. Conceivably, incumbent suppliers might be required to maintain any price increases they 
implement for some specified period of time. This requirement could limit the attraction of, and 
thereby deter, some price increases. This possibility parallels Baumol’s (1979) suggestion for 
discouraging predatory pricing, namely to require firms to maintain below-cost prices after 
competitors leave the industry in response to the low prices. 
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retain customers. In these instances and others, inappropriate regulatory mandates can limit the 
ability of market forces to ensure that the most efficient suppliers deliver to consumers surplus-
maximizing combinations of prices and qualities.43 
 To guard against late deregulation, regulators should not wait until competitors have 
developed perfect substitutes for the incumbent supplier’s services before initiating substantial 
deregulation of the incumbent’s services. To illustrate, suppliers of wireless telephone service 
can impose substantial discipline on suppliers of wireline telephone service even if most 
consumers perceive the quality of wireline calls to exceed the quality of wireless calls. Suppliers 
of imperfect substitutes can deliver particularly strong discipline when the price of a service is 
substantially above its avoidable cost of production.44 
 Stringent sunset requirements (overseen by antitrust officials) can be a particularly 
effective means to avoid undue delays in deregulation. When regulators and/or other interested 
parties are required to present very compelling evidence of the need for ongoing regulation in 
order to secure such regulation, deregulation is more likely to be implemented in a timely 
manner. Sunset requirements overseen by an antitrust authority also can help to shield regulators 
from unjustified criticism that they relaxed industry controls prematurely, and can thereby 
encourage timely deregulation. 
Recommendation 9.   Coordinate regulatory and legislative policies and mandates to limit both 
intentional and unintentional roadblocks to efficient competition. 
 Policymakers and regulators should coordinate their policies and speak with one voice 
when articulating industry rules and regulations. Otherwise, industry suppliers will face 
unnecessary uncertainty about the likely returns from their industry investment, and so may 
curtail welfare-enhancing investment. Furthermore, regulators may face the added burden of 
having to overcome the actions of other regulators or policymakers that impede efficient 
competition. 
                                                 
43  As Judge Easterbrook (1984, p. 15) observes, “[T]he economic system corrects monopoly more 
readily than it corrects [regulatory] errors. … [I]n many cases, the costs of monopoly wrongly 
permitted are small, while the costs of competition wrongly condemned are large.” 
44  Regulated firms often incur large fixed costs of production and relatively small marginal costs of 
production. Consequently, regulated prices that allow a normal return on investment often will be well 
above marginal production costs. Such high price-cost margins imply that a regulated firm incurs a 
substantial reduction in profit if it loses customers to competitors, and so the firm will compete 
vigorously to maintain customer loyalty as competition develops. See Hausman (2003) and Weisman 
(2006).  
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 The U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) faced this burden when it 
attempted to lower the prices of long distance telephone and network access services toward 
cost. Although the price reductions would have increased industry surplus substantially, they 
would have required sizable increases in the price of basic telephone service. Consequently, the 
U.S. Congress and state regulators (who would have borne the brunt of consumer opposition to 
these price increases) opposed the FCC’s proposed policy. Their opposition compelled the FCC 
to slow its intended pace of rate reform (Brock, 1994, chapter 11).45 
 In 1996, the U.S. Congress acted to preempt regulatory and legislative interference with 
its efforts to open the telecommunications industry to widespread competition. The 
Telecommunications Act explicitly prohibited state and local regulators and policymakers from 
limiting entry into the industry.46 Explicit prohibitions of this sort can promote consistent 
industry policy. Collaboration in crafting industry regulation and legislation can also produce 
consistent, coherent industry policy and thereby foster efficient competition, facilitate long-term 
planning, and encourage industry investment. 
Recommendation 10.   At the appropriate time, transfer industry oversight from regulators to 
antitrust officials. 
 Detailed ex ante regulation is appropriate in settings where it is highly likely that 
competitive forces alone will be insufficient to protect consumers adequately. In such settings, 
well designed rules and regulations can deliver the consumer protection that market competition 
alone is unlikely to provide. Selective ex post antitrust intervention is more appropriate than 
regulation when competitive forces are likely, albeit not certain, to protect consumers 
adequately. In such settings, antitrust review can provide a useful check on market performance 
without unduly influencing the nature and direction of market competition.47 
 Selective antitrust scrutiny offers at least three advantages over pervasive regulation. 
First, selective ex post intervention generally is less costly to implement. Second, antitrust 
oversight is less prone to error than is regulation in settings with developing competition. The 
                                                 
45  Keeler (1983, Chapter 5) describes a similar conflict in the railroad industry that pitted new legislation 
against the enforcement of that legislation by the Interstate Commerce Commission.  
46  Section 253(a) of the Act states: “No State or local statute or regulation, or other State or local legal 
requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any 
interstate or intrastate telecommunications service.”  
47  Tardiff and Taylor (2003, p. 345) describe the transition from stringent regulatory control to unfettered 
market competition.   
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vibrant, often unpredictable nature of competition makes it difficult to devise rules that will 
foster rather than retard competitive forces and that will be appropriate for the market conditions 
that ultimately evolve. Consequently, it can be preferable to monitor the conditions that evolve 
and correct any observed imperfections that limit the market’s ability to serve the best interests 
of consumers. 
 Third, antitrust is less subject to capture than is regulation (Baker, 2003). Frequent, 
ongoing interactions between regulators and regulated entities facilitate regulatory capture by 
powerful constituents (Stigler, 1971). Such capture limits the likelihood that industry rules will 
best serve the combined interests of all industry participants.  
 Because antitrust review can provide valuable (ex post) industry oversight, the relevant 
choice as competition develops is not between regulation and no regulation. Rather, the relevant 
choice is between extensive ex ante specification of rules and regulations and selective ex post 
intervention in cases where market competition does not appear to be protecting consumers 
adequately. 
4.  Conclusions.  
 The CRRI conferences have been fertile ground for important developments in regulatory 
economics over the past three decades. These developments include key insights about how to 
harness competitive forces to motivate incumbent suppliers to serve the best interests of 
consumers. We have attempted to complement these insights by noting the potential need to 
motivate regulators to promote efficient competition and discourage inefficient competition. 
Such need can arise in part because competition can complicate the design of industry policy and 
limit the ability of regulators to continue to respond as they have historically to the demands of 
their constituents. Thus, some additional regulation of regulators may be appropriate, just as 
meaningful oversight of overseers is advisable more generally, as James Madison has observed. 
 We have noted that once the potential need to motivate regulators is taken into account, 
standard policy recommendations may require some modification and new policy suggestions 
may be appropriate. For example, we have suggested the potential merit of antitrust oversight of 
regulatory sunset provisions as a complement to ongoing judicial review of regulatory decisions. 
Sunset provisions can require regulators and/or other industry constituents to demonstrate the 
need for ongoing regulation rather than requiring advocates of deregulation to prove its merits. 
Federal antitrust oversight may help to limit undue political influence on key regulatory policy 
decisions. It may also usefully complement judicial oversight by empowering an entity with 
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considerable expertise on issues of market power and industry competition to assess whether 
regulatory actions that are clearly legal serve to promote efficient competition.  
 We have also emphasized the importance of systematic, ongoing  data collection and 
analysis. Regulators and antitrust authorities alike must have access to consistent, 
comprehensive, and timely data about industry regulations and performance in order to formulate 
appropriate policy. 
 The modifications of standard recommendations and the new recommendations that we 
have offered are fairly broad in nature. Many important details remain to be considered. For 
instance, the optimal structuring of sunset provisions merits thorough analysis. Such an analysis 
should include an examination of the optimal length of time between sunset reviews and the 
optimal standard of proof required at each review. The political economy of industry oversight in 
the presence of antitrust review of sunset proceedings also merits further consideration. Antitrust 
authorities may face increased political pressures as their industry oversight powers and 
responsibilities increase.48 As noted above, this pressure can be reduced by limiting the discretion 
of antitrust authorities regarding the timing and the nature of the reviews they conduct. 
Additional policies to insulate the authorities from political pressure may be advisable.49 
 The details of desirable interactions between regulators and antitrust authorities also 
merit careful consideration,50 as do the details of beneficial coordination among regulators, 
legislators, and judges.51 The precise nature of any modification of the Hope standard that is 
appropriate as industry competition develops also remains to be specified, as does a 
comprehensive list of the data that regulators should collect and analyze in settings with 
developing competition. We look forward to future CRRI conferences for guidance on these 
important issues.  
                                                 
48  Carlton (2007, p. 174) questions “whether regulatory capture is less likely when those who enforce the 
antitrust law are the same as those who regulate industries.” 
49  As noted above, the U.S. Department of Justice commissioned a study of the merits of the line-of-
business restrictions on the Bell Operating Companies (Huber, 1987). Conceivably, retaining outside 
experts to direct sunset proceedings could help to insulate antitrust authorities from undue political 
pressure, particularly if the experts in question have strong reputations for fair and impartial 
assessments of regulatory matters. 
50  Weiser (2009) stresses the need to harmonize the activities of regulatory and antitrust agencies and 
emphasizes the role that regulators can play in enforcing the remedies that antitrust agencies impose in 
merger reviews. 
51  Ginsburg (2009) suggests changes to judicial review of regulatory rulings that may be appropriate in 
the presence of “synthetic” industry competition.   
23 
 
References 
Antitrust Modernization Commission. (2007). Report and recommendations. Washington D.C. 
 
Armstrong, M. (2001). Access pricing, bypass, and universal service, American Economic 
Review, 91(2), 297-301.  
 
Armstrong, M. (2002). The theory of access pricing and interconnection, in M. Cave, S. 
Majumdar, and I. Vogelsang (eds.), Handbook of telecommunications economics, Volume I. 
Amsterdam: North Holland, pp. 295-384. 
 
Armstrong, M. & D. Sappington. (2006). Regulation, competition, and liberalization, Journal of 
Economic Literature, 44(2), 325-366. 
 
Armstrong, M. & D. Sappington. (2007). Recent developments in the theory of regulation, in M. 
Armstrong & R. Porter (eds.), Handbook of industrial organization, Volume 3. Amsterdam: 
North-Holland, pp. 1557-1700. 
 
Avenali, A.,  G. Matteucci & P. Reverberi. (2010). Dynamic access pricing and investment in 
alternative infrastructures, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 28(2), 167-175.  
 
Baker, J. (2003). The case for antitrust enforcement, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17(4), 
27-50. 
 
Baumol, W. (1979). Quasi-permanence of price reductions: A policy for prevention of predatory 
pricing, Yale Law Journal, 89(1), 1-26. 
 
Baumol, W. & J. G. Sidak. (1994). Toward competition in local telephony. Cambridge MA: The 
MIT Press and Washington D.C.: The American Enterprise Institute. 
 
Baumol, W. & A. Walton. (1973). Full costing, competition and regulatory practice, Yale Law 
Journal, 82(4), 639-655.   
 
Brennan, T. (2008). Skating toward deregulation: Canadian developments, Federal 
Communications Law Journal, 60(2), 335-368. 
 
Brock, G. (1994). Telecommunications policy for the information age. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Cambini, C. & Y. Jiang. (2009). Broadband investment and regulation: A literature review, 
Telecommunications Policy, 33(10-11), 559-574. 
 
Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC). (1997). Telecom 
Decision CRTC 97-8. 
 
24 
 
CRTC. (2005). Forbearance from regulation of local exchange services, Telecom Public Notice 
CRTC 2005-2, Evidence of the Commissioner of Competition, June 22. 
   
CRTC. (2007a). Review of regulatory framework for wholesale services and definition of 
essential service, Telecom Public Notice CRTC 2006-14, Evidence of the Commissioner of 
Competition, March 15.    
 
CRTC. (2007b). Review of regulatory framework for wholesale services and definition of 
essential service, Telecom Public Notice CRTC 2006-14, Supplementary Material of the 
Commissioner of Competition, July 5.    
 
Carlton, D. (2007). Does antitrust need to be modernized? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
21(3), 155–176. 
 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (1984). 467 U.S. 837. 
 
Colorado Revised Statutes. (2008). 40-15-501. Legislative declaration - purpose and scope of 
part. C.R.S. 40-15-501. 
 
Crandall, R. (1989). The role of the U.S. local operating companies, in R. Crandall & K. Flamm 
(eds.), Changing the Rules: Technological Change, International Competition, and Regulation in 
Telecommunications. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, pp. 114-146. 
 
Crandall, R. and L. Waverman, (1995). Talk is cheap. Washington D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution.  
 
Crew, M. & P. Kleindorfer. (1996). Incentive regulation in the United Kingdom and the United 
States: Some lessons, Journal of Regulatory Economics, 9(3), 211-225. 
 
Crew, M. & P. Kleindorfer. (2002). Regulatory economics: Twenty years of progress? Journal of 
Regulatory Economics, 21(1), 5-22. 
Crew, M. & P. Kleindorfer. (2011). Handbook of worldwide postal reform. Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar. 
DeGraba, P. (1987). The effects of price restrictions on competition between national and local 
firms, RAND Journal of Economics, 18(3), 333-347. 
 
de Butts, J. (1973). An unusual obligation. Speech before the National Association of Regulatory 
Utility Commissioners, Seattle, Washington, September 20. 
 
Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch. (1989). 488 U.S. 299.  
 
Easterbrook, F. (1984). The limits of antitrust, Texas Law Review, 63(1), 1-40. 
 
25 
 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC). (2005). In the matter of unbundled access to 
network elements, Review of the section 251 unbundling obligations of incumbent local exchange 
carriers, WC Docket No. 04-313, CC Docket No. 01-338, Order On Remand, Released February 
4. 
 
FCC. (2009). In the matter of consumer information and disclosure truth-in-billing and billing 
format IP-enabled services. Notice of Inquiry, CG Docket No. 09-158, Released August 28.  
 
Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co. (1944). 320 U.S. 591, 603, 605.    
 
Gifford, R. (2003). Regulatory impressionism: What regulators can and cannot do, Review of 
Network Economics, 2(4), 466-479.  
 
Ginsburg, D. (2009). Synthetic competition, in F. Leveque and H. Shelanski (eds.), Antitrust and 
regulation in the EU and US. Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, UK, pp. 1-19. 
 
Goldberg, V. (1976). Regulation and administered contracts, Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science, 7(2), 426-447. 
 
Grajek, M. & L. H. Röller. (2011). Regulation	and	investment	in	network	industries:	Evidence	from	
European	telecoms, Journal of Law and Economics, (forthcoming). 
 
Hamilton, A., J. Jay, & J. Madison. (1961). The federalist papers. New York: New American 
Library. 
 
Hausman, J. (1997). Valuing the effect of regulation on new services in telecommunications, 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, Brookings Institution, pp. 1-38.  
 
Hausman, J. (2003). Regulated costs and prices in telecommunications, in G. Madden (ed.), 
International handbook of telecommunications economics, Volume 2: Emerging 
telecommunications networks. Edward Elgar Publishers, Cheltenham, UK, pp. 199-233.  
 
Hausman, J. & J. G. Sidak. (2007). Evaluating market power using competitive benchmark 
prices instead of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, Antitrust Law Journal, 74(2), 387-407. 
 
Hazlett, T. (2006). Rivalrous telecommunications networks with and without network sharing, 
Federal Communications Law Journal, 58(3), 477-509.  
 
Hazlett, T. & A. Caliskan. (2008). Natural experiments in broadband regulation, Review of 
Network Economics, 7(4), 460-80. 
 
Huber, Peter. (1987). The geodesic network: 1987 report on competition in the telephone 
industry. Washington, D.C.: The U. S. Department of Justice. 
 
Industry Canada. (2007). Order varying telecom decision 2006-15, Canada Gazette 141, April 
18, available at http://canadagazette.gc.ca/partII/2007/20070418/html/sor71-e.html. 
26 
 
 
Kahn, A. (1970). The economics of regulation: Principles and institutions. Vol. I, New York: 
John Wiley and Sons. 
 
Kahn, A. (1984). The uneasy marriage of regulation and competition, Telematics, 1(5), 1-17. 
 
Kahn, A. (1990). Deregulation: Looking backward and looking forward, Yale Journal on 
Regulation, 7(2), 325-354. 
 
Kahn, A. (1999). Bribing customers to leave and calling it competition, The Electricity Journal, 
12(4), 88-90. 
 
Keeler, T. (1983). Railroads, freight and public policy. Washington D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution. 
 
Lehman, D. & D. Weisman. (2000a). The telecommunications act of 1996: The “costs” of 
managed competition. Kluwer Academic Publishers: Norwell, MA. 
 
Lehman, D. & D. Weisman. (2000b). The political economy of price cap regulation, Review of 
Industrial Organization, 16(4), 343-356. 
 
Levine, M. (1965). Is regulation necessary? California air transportation and national regulatory 
policy, Yale Law Journal, 74(8), 1416-1447. 
 
Levine, M. (1987). Airline competition in deregulated markets: Theory, firm strategy, and public 
policy, Yale Journal on Regulation, 4(2), 393-494.  
 
Littlechild, S. (2003). Reflections on incentive regulation, Review of Network Economics, 2(4), 
289-315.    
                   
Market Street Railway Co.  vs.  Railroad Commission of California. (1945). 324 U.S. 548. 
 
McChesney, F. (1997). Money for nothing: Politicians, rent extraction, and political extortion. 
Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
McChesney, F. & W. Shughart. (1995). The causes and consequences of antitrust: The public-
choice perspective. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
 
OFCOM. (2006). Retail price controls: Explanatory statement. July 19, available at http:// 
stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/retail/statement/rpcstatement.pdf. 
 
OFTEL. (2003). Review of fixed narrowband retail markets. March 17, available at  http://www. 
ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/oftel/publications/eu_directives/2003/eu_retail/retail_3.htm. 
 
Peltzman, S. (1976). Toward a more general theory of regulation, Journal of Law and 
Economics, 19(2), 211-240. 
27 
 
 
Posner, R. (1971). Taxation by regulation, Bell Journal of Economics, 2(1), 22-50. 
 
Posner, R. (1975). The social costs of monopoly and regulation, Journal of Political Economy, 
83(4), 807-827. 
 
Posner, R. (2001). Antitrust law, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.  
 
Robinson, G. & D. Weisman. (2008). Designing competition policy for telecommunications, 
Review of Network Economics, 7(4), 509-546. 
 
Sappington, D. (2002). Price regulation, in M. Cave, S. Majumdar & I. Vogelsang (eds.), The 
handbook of telecommunications economics. Volume I: Structure, regulation, and competition.  
Elsevier Science Publishers, pp. 225-293. 
 
Sappington, D. & D. Weisman. (1996a). Designing incentive regulation for the 
telecommunications industry. Cambridge MA.: MIT Press and Washington D.C.: AEI Press. 
 
Sappington, D. & D. Weisman. (1996b). Revenue sharing in incentive regulation plans, 
Information Economics and Policy, 8(3), 229-248.  
 
Sappington, D. & D. Weisman. (2010). Price cap regulation: What have we learned from twenty-
five years of experience in the telecommunications industry? Journal of Regulatory Economics, 
38(3), 227-257. 
 
Sidak, J. G. & D. Spulber. (1997). Deregulatory takings and the regulatory contract. Cambridge, 
MA: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Stigler, G. (1971). The theory of economic regulation, Bell Journal of Economics, 2(1), 3-21. 
 
Tardiff, T. & W. Taylor. (2003). Aligning price regulation with telecommunications competition, 
Review of Network Economics, 2(4), 338-354. 
 
Telecommunications Act of 1996. (1996). Preamble, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.)  
 
United States Department of Justice (USDOJ). (2010). In the matter of economic issues in 
broadband competition: A national broadband plan for our future, Ex Parte Submission Before 
the Federal Communications Commission, GN Docket No. 09-51, January 4. 
 
Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC. (2002). 535 U.S. 467. 
  
Vogelsang, I. (2002). Incentive regulation and competition in public utility markets: A 20-year 
perspective, Journal of Regulatory Economics, 22(1), 5-27. 
 
28 
 
Weiser, P. (2009). Rethinking merger remedies: Toward a harmonization of regulatory oversight 
with antitrust merger review, in F. Leveque & H. Shelanski (eds.), Antitrust and Regulation in 
the EU and US. Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, UK, pp. 128-159. 
 
Weisman, D. (1988). Default capacity tariffs: Smoothing the transitional regulatory asymmetries 
in the telecommunications market, Yale Journal on Regulation, 5(1), 149-178. 
 
Weisman, D. (2002). Is there ‘hope’ for price cap regulation? Information Economics and 
Policy, 14(3), 349-370. 
 
Weisman, D. (2006). When can regulation defer to competition for constraining market power?: 
Complements and critical elasticities, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 2(1), 101-112. 
 
Weisman, D. & G. Robinson. (2009). Lessons for modern regulators from Hippocrates, 
Schumpeter and Kahn, in R. May (ed.), New Directions in Communications Policy.  Durham, 
NC:  Carolina Academic Press, pp. 3-37. 
 
